By David Butler

The media have run with various stories concerning Arsenal and Chelsea returning unsold tickets to the Europa League final this evening in Baku. Estimates suggest it could be up to 6,000 tickets. The final has been plagued by logistical issues relating to flights and visas, in addition to safety concerns.

Since 2000-01, the average distance travelled by both finalists to the host destination is circa 4000km (one way). Arsenal and Chelsea will travel over 9000km to reach Baku. Keep in mind these finalists are 14km apart.

While this is the tenth UEFA Cup/Europa League final to feature two teams from the same country, the distance the London teams and fans are travelling is by far the greatest in recent times. Similar but less intensive travelling happened in the recent past. In 2006-2007 Sevilla and Espanyol met in Glasgow, with fans travelling nearly 5000km. Porto met Braga in Dublin for 2010-11 final, travelling over 5000km. A year later Atlético Madrid met Athletic Bilbao in Bucharest – this involved travel of over 6000km. These three finals attracted close to a full house. 

Applying a 10% capacity constraint on the venues since 2001 (as UEFA often require lower capacities) shows that only 4 out of 18 finals had an attendance of less than 95% of capacity. These slightly lower attendances may even be explained by bigger stadium capacity rather than fan preferences (i.e.  Westfalenstadion, Dortmund).
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The Baku Olympic Stadium in Azerbaijan holds 69,870 and a UEFA limit will set tonight’s capacity at 64,000. I’ll be keeping an eye out for the attendance figure. Even if it is high, tonight's match may be more for the locals than the core supporters of the two finalists. 

By Robbie Butler

Our annual sports workshop was held last Friday. Among the very interesting papers was a presentation by Babatunde Buraimo about Premier League viewership figures over the course of the past five seasons. The data suggested that the number of those watching live games on subscription television is in decline. This piece here supports this view and claims the fall-off in demand is worrying.

A number of very interesting issues were addressed during the course of the presentation. Firstly, football is one of the few things on television that is not really conducive to "on demand" viewing. The kick-off time is the kick-off time, and that is it. This leads to a second issue regarding the residual value of sport. This is close to zero once a game ends. By this I mean, who wants to watch the full match once the game has ended? 

Of course, residual values do lie elsewhere. This is where the highlights reel comes in. Fans will gladly watch selected moments from a game after the final whistle. This is where the idea of Match of the Day must have its origins. The evolution of the show, first screened in 1964 is terribly interesting, even more so given its popularity today.

With the rise of online, mobile and tablet services, as well as streaming games, one has to wonder how a programme that goes out at around 10.30pm on a Saturday night, long after the outcome of all games is known, and highlights readily available seems to be as popular as ever. 

This certainly deserves more investigation. 

By Robbie Butler

​The 1st Reading Football Economics Workshop will take place from the 19th - 21th of September 2019 in Reading, England.

This event is hosted by the Centre for Institutions and Economic History at the University of Reading, and will include two keynote talks, a number of contributed sessions and informal social events.

Submissions are invited from scholars working in the areas of football economics or football management. This includes the applications to football, or the use of football to inform economics and other topics.

Full paper submissions are preferred, but extended abstracts will also be considered. Submissions should be send to j.j.reade@reading.ac.uk before the 21st of June 2019.

More information on this event can be found here.

By David Butler

​Mick McCarthy emphasised that he had no ulterior motive following the selection of Luca Connell for the upcoming Republic of Ireland internationals. Connell has already lined out for Ireland at U-17 and U-19. This is a hot topic given England’s apparent growing interest in the player and in light of the Jack Grealish-Declan Rice debacles.

International eligibility is set out on page 70 of the FIFA statutes August 2018 edition. I’m led to believe Connell qualifies for the Republic under (c). Eligibility rules are as follows:

(a) He was born on the territory of the relevant association;
(b) His biological mother or biological father was born on the territory of the relevant association;
(c) His grandmother or grandfather was born on the territory of the relevant association;
(d) He has lived continuously on the territory of the relevant association for at least two years.

In an increasingly globalised world I would bet that eligibility controversies will increase in the years ahead. Given global migration patterns there will likely be greater numbers of players with at least dual citizenship.

The design of tournaments may also incentivise 'strategic capping'. There are clear balance issues in several international tournaments. Take the European Championships for example. Low risk competitive matches against Gibraltar, Faroe Islands, Andorra, Malta, San Marino etc. offer nations a great opportunity to strategically cap young players whose allegiances are unclear. These fixtures provide bigger nations a low risk potentially high reward environment to cap a young player. 

If strategic capping does increase my bet is that it is more likely to occur for players who were not born/raised in the country they are called up to represent. There is potential for a weaker identification in such cases and this is where it may likely be seen most. 

Perhaps the rules will change going forward – maybe age limits will be required to be met for a player to be called up for a senior competitive match.  

By Robbie Butler

The most recent Central Statistics Office (CSO) examination of sport and physical activity in Ireland was carried out as part of the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) in 2013. The QNHS Sport and Physical Exercise provides some interesting insights into a variety of sporting and physical activity pursuits, some of which have been discussed on this blog. The survey focuses on persons aged 15 years and over who participate in sport and/or physical activity by age group and type of sport.

This is of interest to me as I am reaching the age where running around a pitch is becoming more and more difficult. Fields sports are very popular in Ireland and while the rules vary between hurling, Gaelic football, soccer and rugby, fundamentally all require participants to run around a large surface area. Fields sports are just as much about running as they are about possession of the ball, as players usually hold the ball for a very limited time in a match that could take between 70 and 90 minutes to play.

The data below demonstrates how fields sports are largely the choice of younger members of the population. Soccer, Gaelic football, hurling and camogie and rugby all report declining participation through the age categories. 

​What sports do people substitute toward as they get older?

​Swimming, cycling and particularity golf seem to be the places the older generation migrate to. Golf is at it's strongest in the 65+ category. Swimming and cycling do see a decline but only after a notable rise in participation to at least the 45-54 age category. Dance and "other" physical activities are also popular for older generations. 

By David Butler

Over the last few weeks I’ve spoken to many nervous Liverpool and Tottenham fans prior to the Champions League final. The fear of having an impressive season but ending without silverware haunts Liverpool fans, and they are particularly uneasy coming up against another Premier League club. For Tottenham fans this may be a once in a lifetime opportunity to see their club in the Champions League final. Tottenham were underdogs at so many stages in the competition – the final is no different.

While the outcome of the final is zero-sum, the levels of pain and happiness may not be. If fans are loss-averse, surely the pain of losing will be greater than the joy of winning for each set of supporters. This got me thinking about the ‘emotional’ or ‘psychological hedge’ – betting against ones preferred outcome or true preferences to mitigate emotional losses.

What value would Tottenham fans place on winning the Champion’s League? The willingness to pay for Spurs supporters to see Hugo Lloris lift the trophy would vary depending on emotional attachment to the club and identity, but how many will ask themselves this question and then stake a similar amount on Liverpool to win? At present Liverpool are 8/15 to lift the trophy – if a Spurs fan would be willing to pay, say €500, to see Spurs as champions, they could hedge and earn over €250 in the likely event that this doesn’t occur. This may ease the pain of a defeat and sooth emotions when Jordan Henderson lifts the cup.

I often wonder how prevalent this type of betting behaviour is – I wouldn’t expect it be present for regular matches where the emotional risks are relatively low, but as these increase, particularly for cup finals, the prevalence of the emotional hedge may rise.   

The emotional hedge might seem like a logical approach, but betting that your club will lose can grate against one’s identity. There are negative emotions attached to betting against ourselves, perhaps a sense of disloyalty creeps in. How many die-hard fans would like it to be known that they’ve bet against their own? Maybe the emotional hedge is a very private phenomenon?

By Robbie Butler

This week it was announced that Gigginstown Stud would wind down operations over the coming years, with a view to exiting horse racing in Ireland in the medium term. With national hunt horses as young as four years old, this could take 6-7 years to play out, assuming the plan remains the same. 

What a blow this must be to many people involved in racing throughout Ireland. The maroon and white of Gigginstown have become famous over the past decade or more, and have enjoyed incredible success both in Ireland and the UK. Probably the most notable example of this (and there are many) is Tiger Roll's back-to-back Grand National successes this year and last. It seems strange to imagine not seeing the famous colours in the years ahead.

The economic impact if this on Irish horse racing will be sizeable. A gradual exit will help soften the blow, but there are few that have put as much money into horse racing in this country in recent times. Of course, there is an upside; that of competition within races.

Quite some time ago now, John Considine addressed the issue of concentration in ownership prize money winnings. Since then anyone that watches national hunt racing in Ireland will be aware of the concentration in the sport, particularly at the elite end of the spectrum. Two trainers and a handful of owners now dominate the sport. Gigginstowns' part in this is obvious, with the owners regularly running multiple runners in Grade 1, 2 and 3 races. In recent years, the owners ran large numbers of horses in big handicap chases and were known to run into double figures in races such as the Irish Grand National. I even recall watching a grade race a couple of seasons ago with just three runners, all of whom ran in the maroon and white. 

The decision to leave will have consequences both economic and and on the sporting front. Ireland's haul at Cheltenham may not reach the same heights as recent years but domestic racing should become more competitive. Many small trainers and owners could get their day in the sun in the seasons ahead.

By Robbie Butler

Our 5th Annual Workshop is just under two weeks away. The full programme is below.

There are a limited number of places available for those that wish to attend. To register for the event click here.

By John Considine

What is driving low rate of fourth down attempts?  That is the question asked by Brian Goff and Stephen Locke in a recent edition of the Journal of Sports Economics.  The paper by Goff and Locke is appropriately titled “Revisiting Romer: Digging Deeper Into Influences on NFL Managerial Decisions”.  Romer addressed the issue in 2006.  Goff and Locke bring more data and alternative techniques to the question.  And, while the authors make a valiant attempt to answer the question, the real value of this excellent paper is to make us question the question.
 
The paper opens with a short review of previous studies that have uses sports data to evaluate decision making.  They conclude that “In the case of many, if not most, of the studies showing a departure from simple rationality or maximization principles, questions arise as to whether the departure arises because agents incorrectly process the available information or because the objective functions for agents are more complex than simple models incorporate”.
 
Then the authors proceed to start by modelling the coach/manager as a points maximizer while acknowledging that “our results align very closely with Romer’s and appear to offer and expand confirmation that NFL managers are not simple maximizers of expected points”.  However, it is difficult to get away from the implicit assumption (or maybe it is a value judgement) that the decision makers should be maximizers of expected points.  This is despite the fact that Goff and Locke draw attention to Romer’s point that the fundamental objective for coaches is to win.
 
I wonder if there is an analogy with golf.  Should players seek to minimise the distance from the ball to the hole with each shot?  Is a player that lays-up stupid or fearful?  If we implicitly assume that the player should seek to minimise the distance to the hole on each shot, and the player takes a three-wood rather than a driver on the tee, then we presume it is incorrect information processing or risk-aversion that led to the decision.
 
The Goff and Locke paper does indeed dig deeper.  It uses more of the information from each game but not all of it.  Telling the reader that neither themselves nor Romer use all the game data acts like a flashing red light.  It prompts one to wonder why that is the case.  Why would one not use the data from the last 3 minutes?  To reinforce the point, they produce estimates that suggest that a “team that trails by 7 points is 3.2% more likely to go for a fourth down” and the fourth quarter “raises the likelihood of going for it by 9.7%”.  Different people might interpret these finding differently.
 
Overall, I think  the paper suggests that “the objective functions for agents are more complex than simple models incorporate”.

By Robbie Butler

​The race for the "Top 4" in the Premier League all but ended at the weekend. I have read a number of pieces about the race for 4th, and the recent failure of Arsenal, Tottenham, Chelsea or Manchester United to recently perform as expected. While Arsenal could still catch Tottenham it would take a three point and 9 goal swing on the last day for this to happen.

Although none of the four are playing particularly well at present, it would be wrong to deduce that the the race for the Top 4 this season is dramatically different to recent times. The form table for the past 5 games has Spurs 13th, Man United 15th and Arsenal 16th but the total number of points accrued after 37 games is not unlike most seasons over the past decade. The figure below presents the total number of points collected by the 4th placed team since 2009/10, and the minimum number required to finish 4th (assume better goal difference). 

If 40 is the magic number to stay up (and this may have gotten even lower over recent history), 70 is generally good enough to make the Champions League. Spurs (or Arsenal) could finish 4th with 70 points. 72 (twice) and 75 points were needed in 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2016/17. Spurs are somewhat different given the number of games they have lost. 10 defeats is generally enough to rule out the Champions League. The North London club have lost 13 games but will still probably finish 4th. A single draw all season is the reason they have been able to carry such a heavy loss rate.

While the past 5 games have not seen the clubs racing for 4th at their best, their totals at the end of the season will look well in years to come. ​Whoever finishes 4th will certainly have earned the right to player in Europe's top club competition next season.