I don't believe a single football fan would have objected to this decision had the game restarted with a free-kick, as has been the case for about a hundred years when such a scenario occurs. Enter VAR. The team in Stockley Park interpreted the rules to mean Fernandez was not offside and the goal stands. It is not how offside is meant to work, nor, in my opinion, the correct interpretation of the wording.

But to compound this mistake, Pro Ref, formerly known as the PGMOL or Professional Game Match Officials Limited, issued an apologetic statement, saying: "the VAR did not recognise the likely impact of his position and should have recommended an on-field review." This statement fails to state that there was an "on-field review". It was done in real time. By the match officials. Who made the right decision.

The VAR then got involved in something where it was not "clear" or "obvious" that a mistake had been made and ended up overturning the correct decision. Today's statement confirms that, and also confirms what a growing number of people believe: VAR makes the game worse, not better, and introduces mistakes that would not be there had the technology not been adopted. It effectively does the exact opposite of what it was intended to do.

Hawk-Eye is a ball-location and score-detection technology that is used to help referees make more accurate decisions during matches. It combines specialised cameras and sensors with computer software that calculates the exact path of the ball or sliotar. The software analyses information from multiple camera angles in real time before determining whether the ball has passed inside or outside the posts. Similar technologies are also used in sports such as tennis and soccer to make accurate line and goal decisions.
 
This post will ignore the financial cost of the system to the GAA.  Instead, it will focus on other costs involved in the decision-making system.  Hawk-Eye demonstrates cost minimisation and trade-offs by balancing two competing costs: delaying the game and making an incorrect decision. Reviews pause play, but avoiding reviews increases the risk of wrong decisions. The optimisation challenge is finding the balance that minimises the combined cost of these two outcomes.
 
At one extreme, imagine Hawk-Eye reviewed every shot, incorrect decisions would become rare, but constant interruptions would slow the game, disrupt momentum, frustrate spectators and increase operating costs.  In this situation, the cost of incorrect decisions is very low, but the cost of delay becomes extremely high.
 
At the opposite extreme, imagine Hawk-Eye was never used or not available. The game would continue without interruptions, making the cost of delay almost zero.  However, the likelihood of incorrect decisions would increase, particularly in close calls where it is difficult for umpires to judge accurately.  A wrongly awarded or disallowed point could affect the result of a match, leading to frustration for all. The cost of delay is minimised, but the cost of incorrect decisions becomes very high.
 
The benefits of using Hawk-Eye also depend on the score margin during the game. If one team leads by 20 points, one incorrect score is unlikely to affect the result, so the benefit of a review may be lower than the cost of delaying play. However, if the teams are level or separated by only one point, the value of making the correct decision is much greater. A single point could decide the winner, meaning the cost of an incorrect decision is much higher.
 
Timing also affects the trade-off. Early in a match, teams have more time to recover from an incorrect decision. Near the end, however, a single point may decide the result, making the benefit of a review greater than the cost of a short delay. This demonstrates the economic principle of trade-offs, where the best decision is the one that minimises the total decision-making costs rather than eliminating only one type of cost.

(Shona is a second year student of economics in UCC.)

The annual general meeting was held in an iconic room that had once hosted Winston Churchill in 1946, where he spoke of a "United States of Europe" as the threat of Soviet expansion emerged on the European continent.

The highlight of the three days for me was a visit to the FIFA Museum in the heart of Zurich. Delegates were given a guided tour of the artefacts on show from each World Cup tournament to date (excluding 2026). Items and memorabilia included jerseys worn by Diego Maradona (World Cup 1986) and Lothar Matthäus (World Cup 1990), as well as match balls from finals, football boots from the 1954 final, and even the pipe of a World Cup-winning manager, now nearly 100 years old.
​
The 2027 conference — the 18th to date — will be held at the University of Poznań, Poland, in the last week of August.

Chapter 2 of Beautiful Game Theory is titled "Vernon Smith meets Messi".  Vernon Smith is an economist who shared the 2002 Nobel Prize with Daniel Kahneman.  Smith got it for his work in experimental economics.  Chapter 2 examines how, in an experimental laboratory setting, professional soccer players play a card game similar to a penalty kick.  The results show that the soccer players can "do the math" even if they might not be able to articulate their strategy.

To motivate the discussion in Chapter 2, the conversations around two penalty kicks are presented.  One penalty kick involved Messi.  There was a delay of one week between the award of the kick and the excution of the kick.  A few nights before the penalty kick was to be taken, a discussion took place between the goalkeeper and others.  It was of the "if he knows that I know that he knows that I know ..." variety.  The second penalty presented at the start of Chapter 2 comes from the 1994 FA Cup final.  The discussion takes place between Eric Cantona and the media after the game.  Initially, Cantona also engaged in the "if he knows that I know ..." variety of explanation before declaring "You know what?  The truth is that I just kicked it".

Beautiful Game Theory was published just over a decade ago.  If a second edition was being published today it might have another penalty added.  The penalty would illustrated a delay of just under 20 minutes.  Much shorter than the week that Messi had to wait and much longer than the time Cantona had to make up his mind.  The penalty would come from the end of the AFCON final of 2026.  The taker was Morocco's Brahim Diaz.  Diaz attempted a "Panenka" against a goalkeeper that had previously saved another "Panenka" from Sergio Aguero.  Moreover, he attempted it with his "weaker" foot.  That particular penalty is a useful one to consider when considering the differences in the economic and psychological explanations of player behavior (e.g. here or here).

If there is a penalty for Morocco in tonight's World Cup quarter-final then there is a good chance that Diaz will take the penalty.

A previous blog post on this site suggests that Donald Trump might be on to something when he questions the purpose of red cards.  That post is called "What's wrong with soccer?" and the question itself is from a publication in the Georgetown Law Journal.  The publication raised the issue of the time invariance of the red card.  Compare the issuing of a red card in the 1st minute versus 89th minute.

Then there is the issue of a player being banned from a future game.  Seen as a punishment, it seems logical that a player and team might suffer beyond the game in which the offence occured.  However, if one looks at who benefits, then it is a little less clear.  There is a sort of externality for a team not party to the original transgression.