by Declan Jordan

If reports are to be believed, Ian Holloway is under pressure to keep his job as manager of newly promoted Crystal Palace. Only two games into the Premier League season the owners of the club are apparently lining up alternative managers. The defeat to Bristol City in the Capital One Cup has intensified speculation on his future following losses to Tottenham and Stoke in the League.

Holloway guided the Eagles to the Premier League through the play-offs last season after finishing in fifth place. Since winning promotion tehy have not been big spenders, signing Dwight Gayle for £6 million pounds, Marouanne Chamakh for an undisclosed amount and a handful of other players on free transfers. This signalled that the club was not going to spend a fortune trying to stay in the Premier League. This is always a delicate balancing act and Holloway has been here previously with Blackpool when he failed to keep them in the Premier League after the club followed a similar frugal approach to it's only season in the Premier League. 

The pressure on Holloway now seems to indicate the club owners are more willing to take a punt on survival, though it's unclear why any investment would be more productive with a different manager.

The pressure on Holloway may indicate an unrealistic assessment of Crystal Palace's chances of doing well or even surviving in the top flight. Since 2005 half of the 8 clubs promoted from the play-offs went back down in the next season. This means Crystal Palace have a 50-50 chance of avoiding the drop.

It does however seem premature to consider changing manager for a promoted club. It would also seem disloyal when Holloway has been so instrumental in getting the club to this position in the first place. An analysis of the recent history of the Premier League's promoted clubs suggests however that promoted clubs are developing a greater tendency to get rid of managers in their first season after promotion. The table below shows the clubs (in bold) that have parted company with their manager within a season after gaining promotion to the Premier League. The clubs highlighted in yellow were those relegated in their first season. 

The table shows that in the last three seasons five of the nine teams promoted changed their managers in their first season, although only one went straight back down. Interestingly three of these came up as Champions and the other two as runners-up. It is more unusual for teams promoted via the play-offs to change manager even though over the period they are marginally more likely to be relegated straight off. Perhaps this is due to a sense of loyalty to the manager that got them there perhaps unexpectedly.

It's more likely to be a hard-nosed business decision. The only manager of a club promoted through the play-offs to retain his job while not avoiding the the drop is Ian Holloway himself. The odds are short on him doing something similar this year.

by Declan Jordan

In a recent post I considered the need for regulation by sports bodies for players suffering from concussion. Such regulation would protect them from themselves and coaches and clubs that may put pressure on them to continue playing while concussed.

It was interesting then to see that the NFL have agreed to settle pending lawsuits from 4,000 retired players. The players claimed the NFL did not properly warn them of the dangers and did not do all it could to help the players suffering from the effects. The settlement is $765 million. It's unclear if that will be enough to address the health needs of former players suffering from long-term effects of the hits taken in the sport.

What is particularly noteworthy though is that a settlement was made at all. It does not come with any admittance of liability, but this outcome has to be a concern for other contact sports and suggests that they need to develop prompt regulations around concussion and protection for players. Even if not for the good of its players, the sports bodies need to act in their wn long-term financial interest.

By John Eakins

An earlier post by John Considine looked at the topic of competitive balance in the All-Ireland Senior Football championship from the perspective of the distribution of All Ireland titles. John correctly suggested that a title for Mayo would improve the overall level of competitive balance in the competition but one could look at more than just the winners to get a sense of the degree of competitive balance. In particular, it would appear that the same teams are competing at the quarter final and semi-final stages of the championship. For example, Kerry has appeared in every quarter-final since 2001(13 in total). Dublin has appeared in 12, Tyrone in 10 and Mayo in 8. In terms of semi-finals, since 2001, Kerry has appeared in 11, Dublin in 7, Tyrone in 5 and Mayo in 5.
 
Many have argued that the introduction of the new qualifier format in 2001 have benefitted the so-called stronger countries more so than the weaker counties. In short the qualifier format allowed losing teams in the provincial championships to enter the ‘qualifiers’ for a place in the All-Ireland quarter finals. To look at this is more detail, an index can be calculated based on how similar (or dissimilar) the counties that reach a particular stage are compared to the same stage the previous year. For example, if 5 teams that reach the quarter final stage in 2012, also reach the quarter final stage in 2013, the value of the index is 5/8 = 0.625. So if the value equals 1, the same teams are in the quarter final (or semi-final stage) as compared to the previous year. If the value equals 0, there are entirely new teams.

Comparing one year to its previous may not properly capture the ‘persistence’ of a counties appearance at the latter stages of the football championship so an additional index can be calculated based on an average of the similarity between the current year and previous year, the current year and two years back and the current year and three years back. Essentially this index represents how similar are the teams that compete at a particular stage of the championship over a four year period.
 
The index values are calculated from the 1970’s onwards to observe any differences in the long term trend. Three graphs based on the results of the analysis are presented below. The first is based on data of the teams that reached the provincial final (effectively the quarter final stage before the introduction of the qualifier format in 2001) or the quarter final stage post 2001. The second graph adds in the values of the indices using the teams that reached the provincial final from 2001 onwards. Essentially this presents a comparison between what happened and what would have happened without the change in format. The final graph is based on the teams that reached the semi-final stage of the championship.

Looking first to Figure 1, in the 1970’s, 1980’s and early part of the 1990’s, on average, about 5 of the teams at the quarter final stage were the same in comparison to the previous year or over a four-year period. In the second half of the 1990’s the index fell to between 3 and 4 teams. This is probably due to the introduction of the open draw in many provincial championships which saw some of the weaker counties reaching provincial deciders. The introduction of the qualifiers however does appear to have reversed this trend with the ‘similarity’ of teams reaching the quarter final  stage increasing since the early 2000’s. 
 
Figure 2 is interesting as for most years post 2001, the ‘similarity’ of teams reaching the quarter final stage is higher under the new qualifier format than compared to the old provincial format (if that was continued). In the years 2009-2012, the gap is especially wide although it has closed again in 2013. There are only two years, 2007 and 2008, where the old provincial format generates a higher similarity index compared to the new qualifier format.

Figure 3 also appears to indicate a reverse in the trend against a more open football championship. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, on average, approximately 1 to 2 of the same teams reached the semi-finals year in year out, whereas in the second half of the 2000’s and beyond this has increased to between 2 and 3 teams. 
 
As Humphreys (2002) states “Competitive balance reflects uncertainty about the outcomes of professional sporting events” pg 133. So a Mayo win in the All Ireland Football final in four weeks’ time will be welcome from the neutrals perspective but it still doesn’t get around the potential problem that the GAA have where the top 8 and top 4 in the competition are getting easier and easier to predict.

By David Butler

After hearing Sky Sports commentators once again refer to 'second season syndrome' I decided to investigate the matter to see whether it holds up. This term is often applied to players and managers when comparing their first and second seasons performance but was originally coined to evaluate a club the season after their promotion to the Premier League. In American sports a similar 'curse' has been referred to as the sophomore slump or sophomore jinx.

There were 8 occurrences of this apparent curse in the Premier League. It happened to Middlesbrough (97/98), Bradford (00/01), Ipswich (01/02), West Brom (05/06), Reading (07/08), Hull (09/10), Birmingham (10/11) and QPR (12/13). All of these teams were promoted to the Premier League, survived for one season and were subsequently relegated the next.

So does this spell doom for Southampton and West Ham, both  of whom finished outside the relegation zone last year?

Since the Premier League became a 20-team competition in 1995, 43% of promoted teams were actually relegated in their first season. In only 1 season were all three promoted teams relegated; this happened in 97/98 when Bolton Wanderers, Barnsley and Crystal Palace all went down. In fact, over the 18 years 'second season syndrome' has happened to just 8 teams or 26% of all those that survived the first season. Hardly a 'curse'? 

On closer inspection 4 out of the 8 apparent second season curses involved the promoted team finishing 17th in their first season, just avoiding the drop. This was the case for Bradford, West Brom, Hull and QPR. Furthermore, Middlesbrough were deducted 3 points in the 97/98 season for failing to fulfil a fixture against Blackburn Rovers after manager Bryan Robson cited an injury and illness crisis as the reason he couldn't field a team.  

The lesson is that the first and not the second season is the greatest challenge for teams in the Premier League. Once a team has survived their first season in the Premier League, there seems to be an approx. 75% chance of remaining for the following season too, given that a sizeable portion of promoted teams go straight back down. 

Myth busted!

By Robbie Butler

At this time of the year one is accustomed to hearing people wonder where do the tickets for the All-Ireland final go.  The GAA provide this information in their Annual Report.  The information is reproduced in Table 1.

The vast majority are given to "County Allocation".  Note that this is not just to competing counties.  It is to all counties.  If you don't have a hurling final ticket then one of the best ways of securing a ticket for the All-Ireland hurling final ticket is secure a ticket for the football final.  You can then trade the football final ticket for a hurling final ticket. 

There will be plenty of Cork people trading football tickets with people from Mayo who have qualified for the football final and visa versa.  Other than indirect demand, there should not be huge demand in Mayo for hurling final tickets - although there will be a few diehard Mayo hurling fans who will go to the hurling final and not the football final.

Almost 13% of tickets go to the Premium & Corporate sector.  Again this is another way of sourcing a ticket.  Or you might "borrow" the term-ticket of someone who has one.

Schools & Educational Bodies get 2,229 while 3rd Level education gets 240. The rest are distributed as above shows.

By Gary Burns

Recently I spoke about the structural change in the American Heavyweight boxing division and in particular its decline in recent decades. Below is an extension of this analysis.

The fall-off in American success is seismic when viewed in a historical context. By the mid 2000’s fighters from the former Soviet Bloc began to dominate the division. The current top 10 contenders for the heavyweight crown, according to The Ring Magazine, contains one American. Five are from former Soviet Bloc countries or Soviet satellite states.

So why has this happened?

Perhaps looking at the calibre of Heavyweight American amateur fighters coming through the ranks may provide some clues. Looking down through former American Olympic medallists who later held world champion status in the professional Heavyweight Division, the names of Floyd Patterson, Cassius Clay, Joe Frazier, George Foreman, Leon Spinks, Evander Holyfield, Riddick Bowe and Roy Jones Jr all appear. In the amateur ranks, Professional Heavyweight fighters traditionally come from the Light Heavyweight, Heavyweight and Super Heavyweight amateur categories. At the Olympics, the United States has not won a medal in the Light Heavyweight category since Athens
2004.

In the Heavyweight Division only 2 bronze medals have been won since Atlanta 1996. The last gold medal was in Seoul 1988. In the Super Heavyweight division the last medal was won in Seoul 1988, silver for Riddick Bowe. While this trend is indicative of the entire American Olympic boxing team, from casual observation performance at the Olympics appears to be a crude indicator of future professional success.

In Los Angeles 1984 for example, the American team won 9 gold medals. In London 2012 the Americans went with a team of 12 but only won 1 gold medal, 0 silver and 0 bronze. This gold medal was won by Clarissa Shields in the women’s Middleweight category. 
 
Whilst maybe a crude predictor of future success, The Games prepares athletes at an elite level as they are fighting the best available opponents from other countries. The next major Heavyweight championship bout is the long overdue Wladimir Klitschko vs. Alexander Povetkin of Russia; both are former Olympic gold medallists.

Remarkably, the heavier boxing divisions in America have regressed to a relatively greater degree when compared to other  weight divisions.The fall in success at the Olympics has not adversely affected American performance in the smaller professional weight divisions. Of the 4 main belts, WBC, WBA, IBF, WBO and including interim belts, Americans hold 41% of titles between Lightweight and Light-Heavyweight but 88% of the two heaviest divisions, Cruiserweight and Heavyweight are occupied by Europeans.

Except for the Heavyweight division, American boxing is in good health. This makes the fall in success of the Heavyweight Americans even more of an anomaly. Several explanatory reasons have been suggested to account for this including the already mentioned growth of European and, in particular, former Soviet/Communist states. Furthermore the fall in American success in the division has been attributed to a reduction in participation rates of young black Americans, traditionally from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.

An increase in educational opportunities perhaps, or an increase in the numbers going into other American sports such as American Football, Basketball and Baseball, all of which require athletes of large size and stature has further
hindered the enrolment rates of boxing. Many Heavyweight Americans come from a different sporting background and only turn to boxing when their ambitions are not met with their desired sport.  Finally, reduced funding in a competitive American sports industry has been cited as a cause .

Should Americans interested in the division be worried?

Heavyweight boxing has always had its apocalyptic predictions. The 1920’s world champion Gene Tunney lamented boxing’s demise when Cassius Clay and Sonny Liston locked horns in 1964. Bob Arum described the Heavyweight landscape as “waiting for the old fat bums to disappear” in 1985 just before Mike Tyson ripped through the division bringing a dangerous, compelling edge to the weight class.  Despite the dark days, there is hope for American Heavyweights.

Deontay Wilder has just overcome his most difficult opponent to date, Sergei Liakhovich, to take his record to 29-O with all victories coming by way of Knockout or Technical Knockout and is an exciting American Heavyweight prospect. 

For now the Heavyweight division has its home in the stadiums of Poland, Germany and Russia. Madison Square Garden and Las Vegas may have to wait a while longer for the return of a title once revered as the greatest crowning glory in all of sports;  Heavyweight Champion of the World.

By Robbie Butler

Following Sunday’s victory at Spa, it’s probably safe to say that Sebastian Vettel and Red Bull will win both the Driver’s and Constructor’s championships for the fourth year in a row. The German’s dominant performance yesterday now  has him 46 points clear of nearest rival, Ferrari’s Fernando Alonso. However, despite Vettel’s supreme racing skills, it has been Pirelli tyres and not his driving, which have dominated the F1 headlines since the season began in Melbourne last March.

For those unfamiliar with the sport, tyres have not surprisingly always been a key element of the racing game. Historically, successful cars have been driven to championship success using a variety of different brands such as Bridgestone, Michelin and Goodyear. 

 In 2011, Italian tyre manufacturer Pirelli became the sole supplier of F1 tyres taking over from Bridgestone. Despite being in their third year of manufacturing, Pirelli have endured months of criticism from drivers, construction teams and fans, resulting in “private testing” with Mercedes, which landed both in front of the FIA. 

So why the problems this year?

Well, the answer is quite simple and can be found by applying the economic tools of competition. In recent years, the public and media have questioned the value of Formula One, when drivers were driving on what we shall call “old tyres”. These tyres were durable rubbers, allowing drivers to pit twice, or in some instances just once, during the course of a race. Fans complained that this was leading to uncompetitive, boring races that saw little change in the order. 

Enter the FIA. The governing body wished to address this situation and approached Pirelli. The tyre manufactures was asked to make tyres ‘less durable’ so races would be more exciting. Drivers are now driving on what we shall call “new tyres”. The problem with these new tyres is that they are regularly puncturing or blowing out and require three to four pits stops per race. The result has been that some races have descended into chaos. 

So here’s the problem. The fans, drivers, FIA, etc. want tyres that are durable enough to prevent easy puncture (or explosion!) but not so durable that they make racing boring. There’s a conundrum and a very tough job for Pirelli to overcome. Safeguarding the integrity of the sport is essential. 

The question of competitive balance, implicitly mentioned in this piece, is an interesting one for fans of F1 and all the more so when one considers that if Vettel wins again this season, two men both of whom are German, have one ten of the last twenty drivers’ championship. How more uncompetitive could it be?  

By Paul O'Sullivan

Interesting developments in French football at present as AS Monaco have mounted a legal challenge to the decision of the French Football Federation (FFF) and the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP) to require that, from June 2014, all teams competing in Ligue 1 must be resident in France and subject to French tax law or face possible suspension from the league (see here, here and here for further information on this story). A judgement is expected from the French Conseil d’Etat by the end of the year. 

What has driven the FFP and LFP decision is the combination of Monaco’s tax-free status, a proposed 75% tax on French incomes over €1m, possibly to be paid by clubs, and AS Monaco’s billionaire owner, Dmitry Rybolovlev. It is claimed that these give AS Monaco such a competitive advantage in the transfer market that the club could dominate the French League, thereby reducing competitive balance and, possibly, long-term fan interest in the league.

 In the principality of Monaco, non-French residents are not subject to any income tax. On the other hand, France and Monaco have an agreement that French nationals resident in Monaco, including football players, pay income tax at the prevailing French rate. This situation has existed for many years without blowing up into a major issue in football.  With the arrival of the Russian billionaire Rybolovlev, however, AS Monaco can now compete financially with any of the richest European clubs, including  current French champions and Qatari-owned PSG, as well have having much more resources than recent champions like Montpellier and Lille.

In the last few years, AS Monaco has struggled.  Even though they reached the Champions League final in 2004, they recently spent two seasons in Ligue 2. With its new-found wealth, however, AS Monaco has returned to Ligue 1 and recruited top ‘foreign’ players like Ramadel Falcao and Joao Moutinho at considerable cost in terms of transfer fees and salaries. What makes the AS Monaco situation unique is that, relative to any French-based club, its tax-free status allows it to a pay any player a given net salary at a much lower total cost, thereby giving them a huge competitive advantage in attracting big-name ‘foreign’ players. Such players have recently joined Monaco even though the club is not involved in this season’s Champions League, usually a major requirement for top players to join a club.

Another possible complication is the proposed 75% tax on French incomes over €1m that would give AS Monaco an even greater advantage. Though the initial tax was declared unconstitutional, it may be imposed on the clubs, rather than players, in future. While the FFP and LFP are against such a high tax rate, on the basis that French clubs would be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis clubs in other European countries, they are also united in their determination to reduce Monaco’s tax-free advantage.

Monaco is also unique among top French clubs in that it has an extremely low, but possibly relatively rich, fan base. Monaco were relegated from Ligue 1 in season 2010-2011 with an average attendance of just under 7,000 and had an average of approximately 5,000 during their two seasons in Ligue 2. In contrast, in season 2012-2013, PSG and Lille averaged over 40,000 while both Marseille and Lyon averaged over 30,000. In their opening home game in Ligue 1 this season, complete with new acquisitions, AS Monaco’s attendance was 14,573 (information on French football attendance is available here). While there may be a novelty affect of seeing the new signings for the first time, it is possible that increased quality will lead to a permanent increase in attendance which will further strengthen Monaco’s
position in the transfer market. Even so, Monaco can argue that a rich owner and tax-free income helps to ‘level the playing field’ with the larger French clubs.

In seeking to ‘punish’ Monaco for their new-found advantage, some have criticised the FFP and LFP for taking a very short-term view. In the longer term, it is argued, a successful Monaco, complete with top foreign players, may increase worldwide support for Monaco and, by extension, interest in the French League, thereby benefitting all French teams. As well as that, the preference of many football fans may be for a successful Monaco as it will increase overall quality in the League and give fans of other teams the chance to see world-class players on a regular basis.

Even if AS Monaco is successful in its legal challenge, the effect of any Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations may be to ensure a similar outcome to that envisaged by the FFF and LFP. For a club with such low gate revenue, FFP regulations may limit AS Monaco’s ability to invest large sums on transfers and wages.

by Declan Jordan

The terms 'League of Ireland fan' and 'long-suffering' are very often used together. Football clubs in Ireland have struggled to convince the sporting public and even the football public that they have a product worth watching. That goes hand in hand with convincing businesses that they have a product worth sponsoring and investing in. There have been a lot of changes to the League of Ireland in recent years, though the sense of crisis has persisted and it appears that the long-suffering fan will not get respite soon.

Some of the changes seen in the last decade or so have seen the FAI take responsibility for the league, the implementation of a licensing arrangement for Premier and First Division clubs and the switch to 'summer soccer' with the season running from March to October. (Of course it seems like this is the first season that we have seen a summer never mind summer soccer).

The most notable changes though have come in the make-up of the leagues themselves and the loss of clubs, the introduction of new clubs, the reintroduction of clubs and changes in ownership and names of existing clubs.

Summer soccer was introduced in 2004,so this is the tenth season of that 'experiment'. It's worth looking at the attrition of clubs in the League of Ireland over that time.The table below shows the number of clubs that have played in the League of Ireland from the 2004 season to the 2012 season (9 seasons) - the current season is not included  even though it pains me to write that Limerick FC have not appeared in the Premier Division. There are 14 clubs who have played every season. There are 15 clubs who have played less than 9 seasons. Some of these have folded (Monaghan United, Kildare County, Galway United, Dublin City, Sporting Fingal, Kilkenny City). Some have entered the league in those years and remain in the league (Mervue United, Wexford Youths and Sathill Devon - now branded as SD Galway). Others have left and re-entered (Cobh Ramblers) and others have changed ownership and assumed the position of a failing club (Cork City and Cork City FORAS and the three lives of Limerick FC/37/FC). The figures in parentheses are the number of seasons each club has spent in the Premier League.

Without doubt this is a very high attrition rate. There must be very few leagues who have had such a high turnover of clubs in a similar period of time. From the 2004 English Premier League teams only Portsmouth could be said to have gone out of business (they are currently in League Two and were this year taken over by a supporters trust. Perhaps this is not a good comparison and instead it might be worthwhile to look at a small, semi-professional league (It's worth noting that over the period since 2004 some clubs in the League of Ireland have moved to a professional set-up though most are now back to semi-professional).

Taking the Norwegian Tippeligaen as a comparison it is notable that of the 14 teams in the 2004 Tippeligaen, only one, Lyn, have since folded. The club had an amateur section which has now after several promotions reached the third tier in Norway.

Perhaps the reason for the different experiences between Ireland and Norway is the structure of Norwegian football has clear links between the divisions below the Tippilegaen, while in Ireland there isn't a clear promotion/relegation structure between the League of Ireland and the intermediate or junior ranks. After a club fails in the League of Ireland there is nowhere else to go. 

The rate of failure of League of Ireland clubs has been held up a s sign of something wrong at the heart of Irish football, but this is far from clear. There's no doubt that the FAI since it took over the league in 2007 has become tougher on clubs regarding sustainability of financing (eg Monaghan United folding as players wages couldn't be raised and the FAI failed to intervene), licencing (eg refusing a Premier Division licence to Shelbourne in 2007 and Cork City for 2010) and sanctioning clubs for financial irregularities (relegating Derry for its dual contract issues).

This could mean that the disruption in the league is a long overdue shake-out of unsustainable and unfair practices in club financing and structures. It may be that the future for the league is better because of the turmoil in the last decade or so. Time will tell if the long-suffering will soon only refer to heartbreak from results on the field.

By Gary Burns

Through greats like Jack Johnson, Jack Dempsey, Joe Louis and Rocky Marciano, America has dominated the heavyweight boxing division like no other country since the introduction of the Marquess of Queensbury rules in the late 19th century. Some champions like Max Schmelling, Primo Carnera and Ingemar Johansson provided a European flavour to proceedings in the first half of the 20th century but were largely the exception to American supremacy.

The American dominance of the division was at a high point between the 1960's and 1980's, with a new era of greats becoming household names. These included Ali, Frazier, Foreman, Spinks, Holmes and, of course, Mike Tyson. Today however, American Heavyweight boxing is a shadow of its former self.

So what went wrong?

Some boxing purists look at the knockout of Mike Tyson by James Buster Douglas in February 1990 as a watershed moment, with this fight spelling the end of the Heavyweight Divisions glory days but data collected on the Pay Per View numbers and gate receipts of the most successful PPV Heavyweights fights would suggest otherwise.

While I couldn’t acquire a full dataset on gate receipts the table below indicates the popularity of the division during the 1990’s. This is in no small part due to the presence of American fighters in all of the top ten fights by PPV numbers.

However a shift in the structure of the division, away from American domination, began to occur in the 1990’s. This decade saw increasing numbers of non-American boxers such as Axel Schultz, Andrew Golota, David Tua and Francois Botha become prominent. In particular, British fighters started to challenge the supremacy of their American counterparts. Frank Bruno, Herbie Hide and Lennox Lewis all had varying degrees of success during this period.

Americans still accounted for the lions share of top ten contenders for the Heavyweight crown but it was a Brit, Lennox Lewis, who began to dominate the division by the late 1990’s and into the 2000’s.

By September 2002 Hasim Rahman had stunned Lewis and Chris Byrd won a version of the title against Evander Holyfield in December of the same year. America's fall from grace continued as Shannon Briggs became the last American to hold world champion status when he lost to Russian Sultan Ibragimov in June 2007.  

American success in the division meant that historically the audience predominately came from that side of the Atlantic. It would be interesting to see the most recent data and ask whether the disappearance of this success has led to a fall in interest from its traditional target audience, the American public? By the mid 2000’s the main broadcaster of PPV boxing in the states,HBO, had at certain times refused to show the Klitschko brothers fights. HBO sports President Ross Greenburg cited a largely disinterested American public, poor quality opponents and the fact the fights were in Europe and would not fit into prime time scheduling (if not time delayed) as reasons for the move. HBO and Showtime have showed some of the Klitschko brothers fights but not on PPV, hinting at the lack of confidence they may have in sales of the fights.

This was a guest contribution by Gary Burns - Gary holds a degree in economics and has made various contributions both to print and online media on Boxing