by Paul O'Sullivan

The issue of doping in sports has been in the public eye in recent years, with cycling, athletics and baseball, among others, having major doping scandals. One sport that has avoided tainting by doping is the increasingly popular triathlon. On the face of it, this may be surprising given the physical requirements of the sport, where athletes swim, cycle and run for relatively long distances and time periods, and the relatively low technical ability required, but perhaps not so for other reasons.

By assuming that an athlete’s natural state is ‘clean’, economists usually frame the decision to dope in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, with an athlete choosing to dope if the expected benefit of doping outweighs its expected cost. The benefits can include higher prize money, sponsorship and appearance fees, the emotional joy from winning, greater  fame, etc. On the other hand, the costs can include the monetary and long-term health costs of doping, any fines and suspensions as a result of detection, the feeling of guilt and reputational damage from knowing that one is a cheat, etc.  Doping has the characteristics of a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ as each athlete may have an incentive to dope if no-one else does, but all are worse off if everyone dopes as win probabilities may be unchanged but all must incur doping costs. 
 
Up to relatively recently, triathlon was a sport with little prize money and exposure. The last number of years, however, has seen a major increase in both participation and general interest in the sport. The ITU World Triathlon Series increased its total prize money for 2013 by over 9% to over $2.25 million (see here), while some Ironman races offer first prizes of $75,000 with the Ironman World Champion winning $650,000 (see here). TV coverage has also increased with Sky showing regular highlights of the ITU Series and Setanta covering the Ironman series. All else equal, one would expect the greater prize money and TV exposure to increase the incentive to dope.

Anti-doping regulation in triathlon is, in theory, on a par with most sports as the two main triathlon bodies, the  International Triathlon Union (ITU) and the World Triathlon Corporation (WTC), have incorporated the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) ‘Code’(see here) and have also introduced the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) scheme(see here). While a small number of triathletes have been found guilty of doping offences in the last number of years, there are still gaps in the testing mechanism (see here for a more in-depth discussion).

One of the major reasons for doping in cycling was that the cyclists and their medical teams were so far ahead of the testers that the likelihood of detection was effectively zero (see Tyler Hamilton’s ‘The Secret Race’ for many examples of this). For instance, it was many years after the introduction of EPO as a doping product before a definitive EPO test was established. The relatively high prize money for successful cyclists and their teams often facilitated substantial  monetary payments from cyclists to their‘medical advisers’ and may also have encouraged the culture of ‘omerta’ in the sport. The relatively low prize money and sponsorship levels in triathlon, and the fact that it is an individual sport, may help to explain why doping has not pervaded triathlon like it did cycling.

Despite all of the above, maybe the answer to the title question is found in a previous contribution to this blog by David Butler (see here) which concluded that “Whether it is athletics, cycling or baseball the force of prohibiting third parties may be no match for the power of local social norms that are fostered and enforced within groups”. Doping may simply be so abhorrent to the triathlon community that the cost of doping simply never outweighs any possible benefit.

By Paul O'Sullivan

Reports this morning (see here and here) indicate that the trouble brewing in European rugby is coming close to boiling point as the bodies representing English Premiership clubs (PRL) and those of the French Top 14 clubs (LNR) have re-iterated their intention to commence a new ‘European’ competition in season 2014-2015. They have given the ‘Celtic’ nations six weeks to decide if they wish to be part of it.

The beef of the English and French clubs with the current Heineken Cup (HC) is with the structure of the competition, especially how many clubs from each country can qualify for the pool stage and how revenues are divided among the participating unions. Currently, the 24 pool-stage places are allocated on a country basis with 22 places based on relevant league performance (6 English, 6 French, 3 Irish, 3 Welsh, 2 Scottish and 2 Italian). The remaining two places are given to the winners of the previous season’s Heineken Cup and Amlin Challenge Cup (ACC) (if the latter two have already qualified, their spot is given to the next best-placed team from their own country. This is how Connaught has qualified in recent years). The argument of the French and English clubs is that this gives the Rabo 12 League a dis-proportionate number of clubs. It also gives the Rabo 12, through its four rugby unions, majority voting power. Under the current system, revenues from HC
are split as follows: Rabo 12 52%, English and French 24% each. Unless changes are made to the current system, the French and English clubs will leave the current ERC-run HC competition at the end of this season.

Both PRL and LNR propose a 20-team competition with the top 6 teams from each league qualifying automatically, with the winners of previous HC and ACC getting the remaining two spots. Revenues would be equally split between the three leagues.

How will the ‘Celtic’ nations react? Some of their clubs will undoubtedly be worse off if the ERC agree to the changes  proposed by the English and French clubs. However, if the ERC refuse to accommodate the Anglo-French alliance and a new competitor is set-up, then all remaining ERC clubs will almost certainly be worse off. A HC without any English or French clubs would not be as popular, both in terms of paying spectators and TV viewers, as it will effectively mimic the current Rabo 12. On the other hand, a new Anglo-French competition may also struggle without the presence of, particularly, the Irish and Welsh clubs. 
 
As well as that, not only would demand for such new competitions be likely to be lower, competitive balance may also suffer as well. Munster, Leinster and the Ospreys (Wales) have dominated the Rabo 12 in the last six seasons even though these clubs do not often play full-strength teams as the current HC is their priority and many players are often missing on international duty. A HC without French and English teams would likely be dominated by Irish teams, particularly if they are regularly at full-strength.

In any new Anglo-French league, recent experience suggests that such a league will be dominated by French clubs who look like they will dominate the current HC for the next number of seasons. This is a consequence of large investment in teams by rich owners which has been facilitated by a salary cap well in excess of that in operation in the English Premiership. The French salary cap for this season is €10m while the English cap is £4.5m (approx €5.35m at current exchange rate). Without levelling the playing field, it is difficult to see many English teams doing well in such a proposed league, especially with the influx of top Southern Hemisphere players to France continuing. 

The worry for the IRFU must be that more Irish players will follow Johnny Sexton to France as it will find it more difficult to generate sufficient revenue to compete with higher wages paid in France. As well as that, investment in academies to develop promising young Irish players will surely be affected, leaving the Irish national team worse off in the future.

The question must be asked as to whether this threat by the English and French clubs is credible and whether it is a  sufficient bargaining tool to induce changes in the current HC structure. One way in which the French and English clubs have signalled how credible their threat is by already having agreed a deal with BT Sport to televise games from their proposed European competition. The ERC have already signed a contract with Sky for the HC over the next few seasons. It is unlikely that Sky will be happy with a HC that does not include English teams. 
 
It will be interesting to see who blinks first.

By Paul O'Sullivan

Cynical fouling in Gaelic football has received much attention in the last number of years, with Sean Cavanagh’s recent ‘rugby tackle’ against Monaghan generating much comment (see tackle here). At present, various mechanisms are in place to deter fouling, e.g. red and yellow cards, suspensions, etc. Despite these, cynical fouling seems to be on
the increase, often to the detriment of supporters and TV viewers. As economists, our first reaction is to conclude that the net benefit of fouling must exceed that of not fouling.  To deter this, the monitoring of, and penalties for, cynical fouling should be sufficiently high to reverse that trade-off.

The GAA has already taken steps to eliminate cynical fouling with the introduction of the ‘black card’ from January 2014. For a number of defined ‘cynical’ fouls, e.g. pulling down players, the offender is to be shown a black card and suspended from the remainder of the game. A player that gets a black card can be replaced by a substitute, except if the offending player is already on a yellow card or if the team has used all of its substitutes. If a team has received three black cards in a game, they cannot replace any more players that receive a black card. If a player receives a black card in three successive games, they must serve a one-game suspension.

The question is whether the black card system will be a sufficient deterrent. This is debatable. For example, if the black card was in operation this season, Sean Cavanagh would only have missed the remainder of game and could have been replaced. Would that have been sufficient punishment given that a clear goal-scoring opportunity was denied and Tyrone won the game by two points?

The black card system should be helpful in reducing the number of cynical fouls early in a game, though it may do nothing to prevent such fouls late in the game (it is unlikely that any policy will eliminate fouling near the end of a close game as the cost of notfouling may be prohibitive). It should also overcome the incentive at present where players not on a yellow card can ‘take it in turn’ to foul as the cost to the team as a whole is relatively low and there is no sanction for accumulating yellow cards.  Perhaps a black card should have an automatic multi-game suspension attached.

As with any corrective policy, it is not sufficient to simply impose new regulations or penalties without taking into  account how those subject to the regulations and penalties will react. The simplest thing for managers to do will be to not use all of their five permitted substitutes in case their team gets a black card near the end of a game. The biggest fear, however, is that the ‘cynicism’ simply takes a different form. As the penalty to fouling is now higher, it may be in the interests of players to dive or feign injury to con the referee into believing that a foul has occurred in order to reduce the number of opposition players on the pitch. To overcome this, the penalty for such behaviour should be severe and should be aided with use of TV evidence, possibly during the game, and retrospective sanctions. Any  player found guilty of diving, for instance, should be suspended for a sizable number of games, say 10, only to be applied during the National league and/or Championship.

Notwithstanding the introduction of the ‘black card’, should the GAA implement even harsher penalties for those found guilty of cynical fouling? If so, what might such penalties be?  Economists would argue that the penalty to fouling should increase as the number of fouls increases.  One possibility is to imitate basketball and introduce a ‘team foul’ rule. In addition to the current yellow and red cards, and future black card, for individual fouls, once teams commit a certain number of deliberate/personal fouls, let’s say 10, they lose a player that cannot be replaced. To further reduce the incentive to foul, increase the ‘tax’ on fouling as the number of fouls committed increases.  For example, once a team loses a player after the first 10 fouls, they lose a second player after a lower number, say 6, of further fouls, and a third player after another 4 fouls. Again, this may not have an effect on cynical play near the end of a game if teams are below their foul ‘threshold’ and have not used all of their substitutes.

The cost of fouling could also be increased by having a complementary benefit for the ‘fouled’ team. For example, after the first ten fouls, each extra foul gives the opposition a free kick from the 45m line or from where the foul is committed, whichever is preferred. After another 6 fouls, the ‘cost’ is increased by awarding the free kick from 30m. After another 4 fouls, a free kick from the 21m line. If cynical fouling persists, amend the foul-number thresholds. Another possibility is to award a penalty kick if a clear goal-scoring opportunity is denied, with the value of a goal scored directly from such a penalty kick greater than the three points for a ‘normal’ goal.

There will doubtless be costs to implementing a scheme similar to that outlined above. There have been numerous recent examples of the GAA adopting a hard-line attitude to fouling but then softening this approach given the number of yellow and red cards issued, complaints by managers, players and supporters, time wasted, etc. As well as that, referees may ‘cop-out’ and review a large number of fouls with TV evidence during a game, thereby taking much longer to complete a game. While it is natural that those most likely to suffer from eliminating cynical play will be loudest in their complaints, it is surely in the long-term interest of the GAA as a whole to eliminate such negativity.

By Paul O'Sullivan

Interesting developments in French football at present as AS Monaco have mounted a legal challenge to the decision of the French Football Federation (FFF) and the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP) to require that, from June 2014, all teams competing in Ligue 1 must be resident in France and subject to French tax law or face possible suspension from the league (see here, here and here for further information on this story). A judgement is expected from the French Conseil d’Etat by the end of the year. 

What has driven the FFP and LFP decision is the combination of Monaco’s tax-free status, a proposed 75% tax on French incomes over €1m, possibly to be paid by clubs, and AS Monaco’s billionaire owner, Dmitry Rybolovlev. It is claimed that these give AS Monaco such a competitive advantage in the transfer market that the club could dominate the French League, thereby reducing competitive balance and, possibly, long-term fan interest in the league.

 In the principality of Monaco, non-French residents are not subject to any income tax. On the other hand, France and Monaco have an agreement that French nationals resident in Monaco, including football players, pay income tax at the prevailing French rate. This situation has existed for many years without blowing up into a major issue in football.  With the arrival of the Russian billionaire Rybolovlev, however, AS Monaco can now compete financially with any of the richest European clubs, including  current French champions and Qatari-owned PSG, as well have having much more resources than recent champions like Montpellier and Lille.

In the last few years, AS Monaco has struggled.  Even though they reached the Champions League final in 2004, they recently spent two seasons in Ligue 2. With its new-found wealth, however, AS Monaco has returned to Ligue 1 and recruited top ‘foreign’ players like Ramadel Falcao and Joao Moutinho at considerable cost in terms of transfer fees and salaries. What makes the AS Monaco situation unique is that, relative to any French-based club, its tax-free status allows it to a pay any player a given net salary at a much lower total cost, thereby giving them a huge competitive advantage in attracting big-name ‘foreign’ players. Such players have recently joined Monaco even though the club is not involved in this season’s Champions League, usually a major requirement for top players to join a club.

Another possible complication is the proposed 75% tax on French incomes over €1m that would give AS Monaco an even greater advantage. Though the initial tax was declared unconstitutional, it may be imposed on the clubs, rather than players, in future. While the FFP and LFP are against such a high tax rate, on the basis that French clubs would be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis clubs in other European countries, they are also united in their determination to reduce Monaco’s tax-free advantage.

Monaco is also unique among top French clubs in that it has an extremely low, but possibly relatively rich, fan base. Monaco were relegated from Ligue 1 in season 2010-2011 with an average attendance of just under 7,000 and had an average of approximately 5,000 during their two seasons in Ligue 2. In contrast, in season 2012-2013, PSG and Lille averaged over 40,000 while both Marseille and Lyon averaged over 30,000. In their opening home game in Ligue 1 this season, complete with new acquisitions, AS Monaco’s attendance was 14,573 (information on French football attendance is available here). While there may be a novelty affect of seeing the new signings for the first time, it is possible that increased quality will lead to a permanent increase in attendance which will further strengthen Monaco’s
position in the transfer market. Even so, Monaco can argue that a rich owner and tax-free income helps to ‘level the playing field’ with the larger French clubs.

In seeking to ‘punish’ Monaco for their new-found advantage, some have criticised the FFP and LFP for taking a very short-term view. In the longer term, it is argued, a successful Monaco, complete with top foreign players, may increase worldwide support for Monaco and, by extension, interest in the French League, thereby benefitting all French teams. As well as that, the preference of many football fans may be for a successful Monaco as it will increase overall quality in the League and give fans of other teams the chance to see world-class players on a regular basis.

Even if AS Monaco is successful in its legal challenge, the effect of any Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations may be to ensure a similar outcome to that envisaged by the FFF and LFP. For a club with such low gate revenue, FFP regulations may limit AS Monaco’s ability to invest large sums on transfers and wages.