By Chloe Lee

​The current state of Formula 1 reflects a landscape that is no longer suiting the drivers, constructors, or the viewers.  Despite the idea that regulations set forward by the FiA, the governing board of F1, should be encouraging more exciting, innovative, and safer racing from year to year, many viewers and drivers feel the sport has become more unwatchable, harder to drive, and overall more unsafe. Cars are now too fast, wide, heavy, or long for proclaimed historic, iconic, or otherwise praised tracks, and many within the FiA refuse to change the schedules in the name of tradition or iconography, even as regulations shift towards innovation.

This leads to the following question: Are rules now making the F1 boring to watch?

Defined more thoroughly, how, if at all, have the developments in F1 car aerodynamics and overall make since 2006 contributed to a both functional and experiential disconnect between modern cars and historic circuits, and has this dynamic influenced both the disuse of certain track layouts or the decline of interest on others?

Upon approaching this question, and as a dedicated fan of the sport, it felt easy to answer immediately; yes, the sport is surely becoming more disconnected from what it used to be. Yet, after a thorough Causal-Comparative Analysis, working to evaluate track fit from both viewer and driver, the findings presented are anterior to this initial hypothesis. 

​​By analyzing average overtakes per race, overtakes growth rate, race betting odds, viewership numbers, # of red and yellow flag per year, comparative qualifying times, and significant regulatory changes, including changes in aerodynamics (ground-effect and the Drag Reduction System (DRS)), car and engine make, the study assesses whether these regulations have positively influenced the sport through the lens of the selected F1 tracks. Tracks in which overall track scores improved  over the course of 20 years, showing positive influence, are Hungaroring, Imola, Nurburgring, Monza, Silverstone, and China (see figure below). Tracks in which overall scores did not improve over the course of 20 years, showing negative influence, are Monaco and Spa.

Analyzing the findings in the context of that initial question, the developments in Formula 1 car aerodynamic and overall make since 2006 has generally not contributed to a function nor an experiential disconnect between modern cars and historic circuits, with moderate exceptions. This dynamic has influenced track calendars and track interest notably through the displayed moderate exceptions seen in Spa and Monaco.

​In recent years, Spa is now an “alternating” track, where it alternates yearly with another circuit, showing the “disuse,” while Monaco is often dreaded due to low overtakes and slow lap-times. It can also be noted that, while not shown in the findings, track calendars and track interest have been influenced by tracks of the likes Nurburgring and Imola, as they have been removed from season calendars as a result of perceived danger or loss of spectacle, despite fan engagement at these track formats.

Chloe Lee is a a senior student in high school, Arizona, USA.

By Daragh O'Leary

One of the biggest challenges economists and other researchers face when conducting research is trying to measure theoretical concepts. Economists must come up with ways of measuring things which don’t have a natural numerical value. Innovation is a good example of this. Innovation is a well-researched topic in economics, but there is no natural way to measure innovation, so economists come up with ways to proxy it.

For example, they may survey businesses and ask them whether they have introduced a new product in the last year or not. They then use these responses to create a binary variable which is coded as 1 if the firm introduced a new product and 0 if not. This measure allows the economist to operationalise a certain kind of innovation where new products are introduced, but unfortunately, the same variable doesn’t permit the measurement of other facets of innovation where no new product is introduced e.g., improvements to production processes. Furthermore, the binary measure also makes no distinction between radical and incremental innovations which may differ significantly in terms of their impact.

Sports economists often encounter this same issue. A recent analysis on Monday Night Football by Jamie Carragher got me thinking about this. Carragher was analysing an Arsenal set piece routine which resulted in a goal against Newcastle. Usually when fans talk about goals being scored from corners, they generally mean goals which involved an uncontested cross coming into the box where players ambush the space around the keeper and defenders which allows them to head the ball into the net. Obviously, this is not the most exciting type of goal to watch, but as Carragher points out in his analysis, the goal Arsenal scored from this corner wasn’t like most other goals scored from corners. 

The corner routine involved Noni Madueke passing the ball to Kai Havertz who was in Newcastle’s penalty box. Havertz then takes two touches and passes the ball to his left to find Eberechi Eze waiting outside the penalty box. Eze then strikes the ball into the top left corner of the goal putting the Gunners ahead. I assume most fans would agree, that Eze’s goal is far better to watch than most of the goals Arsenal score from corners. Such was the discrepancy in style between this goal and most other goals scored from corners, it made me question whether or not it should even count as a goal scored from a corner.  

If one was to try and come up with a way of measuring how many goals a team scores from corners, they would first have to come up with a binary definition which allowed them to indicate not only when a goal was scored from a corner, but also when a goal has not been scored form a corner. This may seem easy, but it is quite challenging in practice.

Should the definition be: any goal which is assisted by the corner taker? If so, Eze’s goal wouldn’t count.

Should the definition be: any goal which is scored from a cross played in by a corner taker? Again, this means Eze’s goal wouldn’t count.

Perhaps the definition could be: any goal which is scored after a corner is taken, but before the ball goes out of play. This would mean that Eze’s goal qualifies, but many would argue that this definition would result in a series of false positives.

Let’s say that the ball gets crossed into the box from a corner and the keeper punches it clear. Then the ball is recovered by an attacking player who passes back to their keeper, who subsequently launches the ball up to one of their wingers, who then makes their way into the box and lays the ball off to their teammate who scores.

At some point in the above situation the phase of play occurring ceases being a corner routine and resumes being open play. Accordingly, most spectators would accept that the goal which was described above was not scored from a corner. However, our definition would measure this as a 1, so our subsequent analysis would consider it a goal scored form a corner the same way it would a direct header resulting from a cross.

​Properly defining when goals have and haven’t been scored from set pieces is an important task for football analysts moving forward. Set pieces seem to be playing an increasingly important role in football now. To learn from them, when must be able to measure them.

By John Considine

A few weeks ago I posted a picture designed to illustrate the excitment in the 2025 Senior Hurling Championship.  The Munster Hurling Final between Limerick and Cork stood out as the most exciting game of 2025.  However, there was a caveat.  The games in the picture were only those games shown on the national broadcaster (RTE).  By virtue of being broadcast on RTE these games attracted the largest audiences and were, therefore, likely to be remembered as the most exciting by most people.  In that post I noted that the most exciting game of the 2025 season, according to the measures that I was using, was not listed.  That game was between Dublin and Offaly.  On Saturday, the 2026 version of the game was broadcast on GAA+.  Below are some measures of the outcome uncertainty and excitment in that contest.

There were 56 scores in the game.  It ended level on a scoreline of 4-22 to 2-28.  The last score of the game came just under a minute from the end of a game that lasted close to 75 minutes.  If one were to look at the scoreboard after each of the 56 scores then the most common margin between the teams was a 2 point lead for Dublin as illustrated below by the largest blue bar.  The teams were level on 9 occassions.  Offaly never led by more than 2 points and Dublin never led by more than 4 points.

One can understand why those who watched the game felt it was a good game.  Plenty of scores.  The game within one score (or three points) for the vast majority of the time.  The outcome determined 1% of the time from the end of the game.  I'm not so sure about the views of a man from Offaly that I met the following day.  He suggested Offaly should have won.  A knowledgable hurling man but I'm not sure the above picture would support his views.  That said, those green and gold bars came from the closing stages of the second half.  He could be correct.

By Robbie Butler

Our recently accepted paper in the Journal of Sports Economics - ​Objective Calls under the Spotlight: Referee Consistency and Behaviour on Football’s Biggest Stage - was picked up by The Conversation. 

Last week, the website published a peice that we co-authored called "Football is being spoiled by time‑wasting – what can be done ahead of the World Cup?". 

The articel provides a brief overview of the main findings and possiblw solutions to the probaby in football. The full peice can be found here.

By John Considine

Ian Graham’s How to Win the Premier League is a fine book for the way it outlines the difficulties with data and its analysis.  The subtitle of the book is “The inside story of football’s data revolution”.  I found the story of the evolution, rather than the revolution, more interesting.  It is neatly illustrated by a section called “The Ridgewell Problem”.
 
One of Graham’s earlier models rated Liam Ridgewell as one of the best defenders in Europe.  Yet, Ridgewell was on a Premier League team that ranked 19 of 20 when it came to expected goals conceded.  Graham says that “In common with other team sports, football has found it most difficult to measure and analyse defensive ability.  The problem we had was that we were unsure of the defenders’ positions when tackles didn’t happen and a dangerous chance was conceded.”  The italics are Graham’s.  How do you measure something that didn’t happen?  Let us park this for the moment.
 
Economists encounter something similar.  It is called the broken window fallacy.  Our gut instinct tells us that when a kid kicks a ball through a window it is a bad outcome.  However, if the kid employs a consultancy firm then the consultants will explain how the kid is serving the economy and should get preferential fiscal treatment.  They will explain that the expenditure of money on the replacement glass, and the person who installs it, are only the first round of a chain that will boost national income.  They will explain how the glass-shop owner and the window installer will spend the money they got and this will generate income for others.  There will be a multiple of the original expenditure circulating.  These consultants are like the data analysts that are measuring what happened rather than what did not happen.  We see the tackles just like we see the expenditure of the window owner on a replacement piece of glass.  We do not see what he would have spent the money on otherwise.  We do not see a goal if it was prevented.
 
I was reminded of this last Sunday by an excellent piece of defending in hurling.  It can be viewed here from 11:50 to 11:30 on the footage.  One of the best, if not the best, attackers in the game collected the ball in his hand.  This meant that one of the attacker’s two permitted catches was taken.  The attacker turned left towards goal and considered shooting but the defender was close enough to block any potential shot.  Therefore, the attacker elected to put the ball on his hurley and run towards goal.  The defender had positioned himself so that the attacker took the outside, and longer, route to goal.  There were two further benefits for the defender.  The attacker would be forced to strike off his relatively weaker side and from a narrower angle.
 
As they raced towards goal, the attacker tried to open up the angle a little. This required greater ball security so the attacker used his final permitted catch as he turned in.  This reduced the attacker’s advantage as he could only cover four steps with the ball in hand.  Realising he could not open the angle, the attacker tossed the ball back onto his stick and attempted to push away the defender.  But the defender had left enough of a gap that the handoff was only partly successful.  In addition, the defender had used the narrowing of the space to push the attacked the other direction.  The defender also clipped the attacker with his hurley in the way that a jockey twists his whip towards a horse’s neck to remind him of his presence.  He was unlikely to incur the wrath of the officials for excess use of the hurley.  At this stage, the attacker still had the ball but he had only one hand on the hurley that he was holding short to ensure ball control.  He could no longer catch the ball.  As a result, he tossed the ball upwards and struck it one-handed from a narrow angle and off his relatively weaker side.  The ball was struck off target (although the goalkeeper made sure at the cost of a 65m free shot).  Why did Aaron Gillane not score?  Maybe Sean O'Donoghue had something to do with it.
 
At 12:27 the commentator says, “Brilliant, from goalkeeper and forward”.  Even excellent defending that is seen is not often appreciated.  We might be a while away from being able to put the previous two paragraphs into data usable by statistical models.  Long live the Evolution.

By Robbie Butler

World Players Institute 2026 "Where Research Takes the Field: Informing decision making, bargaining, and practice in sport".

On 27-28 October 2026, the World Players Institute (WPI) will host its inaugural conference (WPI 2026) in partnership with Trinity College Dublin (TCD).

As sport continues to grow—with longer seasons, ever-increasing revenues, expanding global reach— athletes remain underrepresented in decision-making processes. This power imbalance is most effectively addressed through collective bargaining, which depends on reliable data and rigorous research to strengthen athlete voice and ensure equitable outcomes.

While significant research on such key areas as economics, labour rights, and health and safety in sport already exists, WPI 2026 provides a unique platform for this evidence to create real impact. By fostering relationships between academia and player associations, this conference bridges the gap between theory and practice through co-created research and projects that directly support athlete welfare.

Abstracts submission deadline: 31 May 2026. For more details, visit https://event.fourwaves.com/wpi2026.​

By John Considine

Was the Munster Final between Limerick and Cork the most exciting game of the 2025 senior hurling championship?  Possibly not.  More about that later but let us make the case for it being the most exciting game of the year.  The visual evidence is presented below.  The Munster Final comes out top (right) even without extra-time and penalties.

The big red bubble shows that the state of the game (Cork ahead, Level, Limerick ahead) changed more that 20 times and that the teams were within one score (3 points) of each other for close to 92% of the time.  The other red bubble is the Leinster hurling final.  A less exciting contest.  Pairwise comparisons should convince people that the picture has some validity.  The yellow/gold bubbles are the two All-Ireland quarter finals.  Dublin versus Limerick was more exciting than Tipperary versus Galway.  The green bubbles are the All-Ireland semi-finals.  Tipperary versus Kilkenny was clearly more exciting than Cork versus Dublin.

The green bubbles can be used to explain the relevance of the size of the bubble.  The bigger the bubble then the final outcome is determined closer to the end of the game.  The Tipperary v Kilkenny green bubble game went pretty closer to the wire.  The smaller green bubble shows Cork went ahead very early and never looked back.  The big blue bubble towards the bottom-left is Clare v Cork.  This game did go to the wire.  A larger bubble produces more excitment at crunch time.  So, why is it towards the bottom-left?  Before Shane Barrett was sent-off, three-quarters of the game had passed and Cork had a nine-point lead.

These are not all of the games in the 2025 championship.  These are the games that people might remember as being shown live on RTE.  There was game, not shown live on RTE, that could be deemed to be more exciting than the Munster hurling final.  It had over 30 game state changes and the teams were within one score 100% of the time.  What was that game?

Cork and Limerick renew rivalry on Sunday in the 2026 League Final.  Let us hope it is like the big red bubble rather than the earlier round robin clash between the teams.  You will find that game represented by a small, blue bubble on the bottom-left.  Limerick went ahead early and stayed ahead.  Little excitment.

By John Considine

The FIFA World Cup playoff between Ireland and Czechia will probably be remembered for the penalty kicks.  Only a few days after the event, it is relatively easy to remember that Czechia won the contest on a penalty shootout.  It is also relatively easy to recall that Ireland scored a penalty kick to go 0-1 ahead in the game and that Czechia scored a penalty kick to narrow the deficit to 1-2 (only minutes after Ireland had taken a two-goal lead).
 
The in-game Czechia penalty was awarded after an Irish player pulled the jersey of an opponent in the penalty area.  It is difficult to argue with the decision of the referee – VAR did not intervene to suggest the referee made an obvious error.  Why did the Irish player do it?  We don’t know.  But we can speculate.  When we do so we usually have some benchmark behaviour in mind and we compare the actual behaviour to this behaviour.  What would Jesus have done?  What would Homo Economicus (HE) have done?
 
At the moment of the decision, what would HE (this god-like creature) have based the decision on?  HE would know the probability of the Czechia player scoring a goal if HE does not pull the jersey.  HE would know the probability of being seen pulling the jersey, the probability of the referee deciding it is enough for a penalty, the probability of a VAR intervention, the probability of the Czechia player converting the penalty given the quality of the Irish goalkeeper in such situations, and so forth.  With this information HE would calculate the expected outcomes of the various courses of action and HE would optimise.  (For the moment, let us ignore the possibility that the individual’s costs and benefits are not aligned with those of the team.)
 
Behavioural economists might suggest that the Irish player, Ryan Manning, did not decide like Homo Economicus (and, therefore, HE is a poor guide for economic thinking).  Manning did not have the luxury of being able to stop time.  Daniel Kahneman might suggest that Manning was thinking fast rather than slow?  Behavioural economists would suggest that his decision was framed by the context.  The passage of play began with a corner kick where the blind-eye of the referees is like that used by financial regulators before the Great Recession.  Manning, and others, were using their hands to restrain opponents in the seconds before the award of the penalty.  At what millisecond did the application of the rules revert to “normal”?  Regardless, the penalty was awarded and it then became an interaction between the Irish goalkeeper and the Czechia penalty kicker.
 
Economists who use Homo Economicus to guide their thinking are more at home when it comes to the strategic interaction between the penalty taker and the goalkeeper.  It is possible to model it with a 2x2 payoff matrix for a simultaneous game.  Two players: Keeper and Kicker.  Two strategies: Left and Right.  The equilibrium occurs where players mix their strategies.  Where the kicker and keeper are HEs then their optimal behaviour is described as minimax.
 
It is, probably, not really a simultaneous game (as explained here previously) but that has not stopped economists and psychologists using the data to confirm their view of humans.  A few economists linked to Chicago have shown that kickers and keepers make good decisions – not unlike Homo Economicus.  The psychologist Michael Bar-Eli uses a 3x3 division of the scoring space to show that there is a bias in some of the decisions.  The psychologists might be unemployed in a world populated by Homo Economicus.
 
An interesting aspect of the data is the difference between in-game penalties and those in a penalty shootout.  For penalty shootouts the evidence suggests that, on balance, a team is better off shooting first.  The captain who wins the coin toss will usually select to shoot first.  Where they have decided to shoot second, there is a greater chance that the captain was a goalkeeper.  Is this a misalignment of term and individual incentives?  Possibly.  Keepers are rarely blamed for a penalty shootout loss but are given credit for saves.  It is difficult for a kicker to get away from being seen as an individual with responsibility – even if it starts with each team taking 5 penalties.  Score the winning penalty and you will be remembered forever, miss the critical penalty and they will never forget you.